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AN ANALYSIS OF GOVERNANCE, OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
By 
Niaz Ali Khan 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the Impact of Good governance on effective 
utilization of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in transition 
countries as compared to developing countries. We use a data covering a 
panel of 32transition countries in the, from 1996 to 2013. The empirically 
study finds strong evidence supporting a positive impact of good 
governance on ODA. We find strong and robust evidence that governance 
has a positive impact on effectively of ODA. Therefore, the study reached 
on conclusion that effective aid utilization required institutions efficiency. 
This suggests that the other in order to reap the best benefits of ODA 
improvement in Governance is the first and foremost milestone to be 
achieved in transition countries as in the case of other developing 
countries. Both developing and transition economy need institutions 
reform unless any reform effective aid utilization is dream for both 
developing and transition countries. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction: 
The last 20 years have seen a real explosion of interest in the quality of "governance" 
in the developing world. Driving this growth are people who variously seek to monitor 
conditions in and/or assess prospects for diverse developing countries in terms of local 
political stability, investor-friendliness, economic growth or effective market size, poverty 
reduction, respect for human rights, Voice and Accountability, Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. These people 
notably include international investors, national and multilateral providers of official 
development assistance, and development analysts and academics. 
The World Bank, defined “good governance” as “epitomized by predictable, open 
and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an 
executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law” (The World Bank, 
1994).While Asian Development Bank defined  
“Governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s social and economic resources, which presumes the ability to turn public resources 
into positive human development tout comes.” (Asian Development Bank, 2002). 
Development researchers and practitioners focused on “Good Governance” as paving-
stone to achieve countries’ development goals, milestones and objectives. Since good 
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governance plays a vital role in the management of aid and public sector reform. 
Development aid is being granted to countries for more than three decades. However, the 
development that donor countries expected to see in the developing countries has not seen in 
those countries. Therefore, numerous research studies on aid effectiveness have been 
conducted and various reasons for minimum progress have been put forwarded. One which 
should be highlighted is, with the passage of time, institutions could not develop their 
capacities due to which the aid received was misused and mismanaged. That is why; today 
developing countries receiving millions of dollars of ODA are achieving mere a proportionate 
development. Moreover, there are widespread disbelieves among the donor countries on the 
effectiveness of ODA because of mismanagement and poor governance. The former Prime 
Minister of United Kingdom, Tony Blair said “Within the donor community, the focus has 
shifted decisively towards increasing the effectiveness of aid, ensuring that it offers countries 
a hand up not a handout”. Further “…major donor countries of the OECD invest more than 
USD 3.5 billion in governance every year…and more than 60% is focused on tackling errors 
of commission through public financial management systems, strengthening of civil society 
and oversight bodies, support to parliaments, media, NGOs, human rights watchdogs and 
anti-corruption commissions”. This shows the importance of governance in the management 
of aid and public sector reform. 
There is an extensive perception among academic researchers and aid practitioners 
alike that there is substantial association between aid effectiveness and good governance, and 
that aid is successful only when linked with comprehensive policies in the recipient countries. 
These situations do not stand up to careful scrutiny of existing studies. Nevertheless, the 
existing studies find that “…approaches used to strengthen good governance in developing 
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countries remain strikingly similar to those used to promote economic reform” (World Bank 
2011). Since positive impact of aid has been proven and its plays a significant role on 
economic development of developing countries and especially countries in transition, it is 
crucial to manage the aid effectively. 
Development partners have been increasingly observant on the utilization of their 
development assistance given to the countries in need. At the same time donors and partner 
countries have been increasing their attention to accountability and transparency issues, partly 
as a way of ensuring aid effectiveness, improving good governance and aiding economic 
growth and partly as a foundation for the Paris Declaration Principle of mutual accountability 
(OECD).In response to the greater demand for accountability of the utilization of 
development assistance and quality of governance, the World Bank has come with 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI ranks countries based on Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. 
 Over the years countries have received billions of aid. Unfortunately, aid granted to 
reduce poverty and achieve sustainable economic growth has not been utilized the way it 
should have been. The development targets of the countries remained unachieved over the 
years; large part of the population is still living below the poverty line set by United Nations. 
Development aid has not been effectively utilized to erode poverty, unemployment and 
corruption that have been ravaging the countries for many years. 
There are many reasons for the mal-utilization of ODA. Different researchers have 
different views about ODA effectiveness. Nevertheless, un-directed fiscal policy, bad 
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governance, delayed releases and mismanagement are some of the hurdlers that come in way 
of development, that would have brought by huge assistance obtained from the world 
community in shape of loans, grants, ODA, technical assistance etc. In order to achieve real 
sustainable economic growth and reduced poverty, developing countries are in immediate and 
dire need of reforms in order to utilize aid effectively, that would rebuild the lost trust of 
donor countries/organizations/agencies. Since some research has proven positive impact of 
governance on effective utilization of aid, donor countries/agencies have been extremely 
cautious on countries’ governance records. 
“A striking fact that distinguishes economies (or better: societies) in transition from 
(other) less developed countries or emerging markets is that their economic reforms do not 
take place within an existing, relatively stable institutional order which is changing only 
incrementally in the course of time” (Ahrens, 2006). So far there are no studies conducted on 
the impact of governance on ODA effectiveness in countries in transition. The countries in 
transition face unique hurdles compared to developing countries. Countries in transition 
require extensive reform policies that would strengthen the institutional capacity required to 
implement transitional policies. Hence scholars and policy makers argue good governance is 
the key to successfully implement transitional strategy. (Ahrens, 2006). 
The countries in transition face complex organizational systems, which acts as a 
bottleneck to successful disbursement of aid, monitoring and evaluation. This would 
eventually open windows for poor governance and corruption. As such Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 2013 shows transition countries as well as developing countries records are poor 
according to Transparency International. This indicates the grave situation faced by those 
countries and also immense effort required to overcome the problem. Moreover, former 
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British Prime Minister highlighted that democracy is one of the crucial elements of good 
governance as democratic values always remain under threat. 
The proposed study has advantage over previous studies that this study will examine 
the impact of governance and utilization of ODA on economic growth in two different 
structure of the economy i.e developing1  assuming closed to market economy and transition 
countries 2 . The countries in transition are selected based on the criteria set by Asian 
Development Bank (ADB).According to the current context countries in transition refers 
“change from one type of market economy where patrimonial or patron client relationships 
are widespread to a rules-based system of market relationships…transition towards political 
pluralism and a rules-based market system…” (ADB, 2014).  
There are six Governance Indicators measured by World Bank.  The proposed study 
focuses on three Governance indicator i.e Control of Corruption, Governance Effectiveness 
and Political Stability. Corruption, political stability and governance are the key issues 
enabling effective aid utilization in developing countries; therefore, these three indicators are 
selected to seek the impact of governance on the utilization of aid effectively.  The main 
research question of our study will be to examine the impact of governance on the utilization 
of ODA effectively in the transition countries. 
                                           
1  Developing countries are those countries which has less industrial base and low Human Development Index 
(HDI) relative to other countries. 
2 Transition countries are those countries which attempt to change their basic constitutional elements towards 
market-style fundamentals. (Feige, Edgar L. 199) 
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1.2. Statement of Problem 
  Absence of clear evidence of the effectiveness aid in an economy tends to undermine 
development efforts of development partners. Typically, aid policy has a specific purpose. For 
instance, some development partners focus on interventions that directly target welfare 
improvement of the poor. On the other hand some aim to increase economic growth and do so 
by channeling their aid towards investment activities. Whether any of these forms of aid 
delivery work is an empirical matter that needs to be investigated on a case by case basis. 
Thus for the case of the southern Africa, there is need to establish evidence of the impact of 
aid on investment and growth in order to fill this knowledge gap. 
  Filling the aforementioned knowledge gap will be beneficial to both donor and 
recipient countries within the region. Since there is still disagreement on the general impact 
of aid, establishing evidence on whether aid facilitates investment and growth will help 
improve development efforts in the region as development partners will be able to make well 
informed decisions on how best to allocate aid resources. If it is established that aid has a 
positive impact on investment and economic growth, development partners will have to focus 
their efforts on enhancing investment. If the evidence proves otherwise they will have to 
rethink their aid policies. 
1.3. Research Questions 
  Keeping in view the importance of importance of ODA for developing countries to 
brigade the gap between saving and investment and its impact on economic growth, and 
limited research to take both developing and transition countries simultaneously to seek 
nexus of governance and ODA, the study is designed to investigate governance and aid effect 
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on economic growth in two different structure of the economy i.e.  developing and transition 
countries. The advantage of taking two different structure of the economy is that it will 
explain whether aid is more effective in developing countries which are closed to market 
economy or in transition countries. 
 To estimate aid and governance impact on economic growth in two different 
structure of economy i.e.  developing and transition countries 
 To seek conditional  impact of aid on economic growth incorporating interaction 
term for developing and transition countries  
1.4. Hypothesis (or Claim) 
Ho: Aid and Governance are being ineffective (γ and β = 0) 
Ha: Aid and Governance are being effective (γ and β > 0). 
1.5. Structure of the Paper 
  This paper is organized as follows. Following the introduction provided above, a 
review of existing literature relevant to the study will be presented in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
shall discuss the methodology used in the study including data, specification of the 
econometric model and definitions of the variables used. An econometric analysis will be 
conducted in chapter 4 in which the findings will be discussed and interpreted. Finally, 
chapter 5 will contain summaries, conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Literature Review 
  No studies have been conducted on the impact of governance on effective utilization 
of ODA in transition countries. Therefore, this study will be based on the experience of 
developing countries, as scholars have indicated countries in transition and developing 
countries have similar characteristics in terms of institutional capacity, public policy and 
other governance related issues.  
International Financial Institutions especially the World Bank remains at the forefront 
of advocating global governance on strengthening the effectiveness of aid and good 
governance. The Bank carried out extensive analysis on the relationship between the aid 
effectiveness and good governance. The study finds that there is positive relationship 
between aid effectiveness and good governance (SantisoCarlos, 2011). Furthermore, the 
evidence from cross-country analysis shows governance is positively associated with 
improved investment, growth rates and government effectiveness, efficient bureaucracy and 
rule of law are associated with better economic performance (ODI, 2006). Pertaining to these, 
further study conducted by Brautigam and Knack (2004) found an improvement in 
governance benefits everyone especially in utilization of aid effectively. However, some 
studies also find that the developing countries face problems on utilization of aid effectively 
due to bad governance and lack of capacity of the government institutions. A cross-sectional 
study conducted using 32 African countries for the period of 1982 to 1997, found, aid has 
been reduced in many parts of Africa due to poor governance records, and “improving 
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governance means better bureaucracy, increasing adherence to the rule of law, reducing 
corruption, and managing expenditure and revenue generation in a sustainable manner”, (A 
BrautigamDeborah & KnackStephen, 2004). This argument was further supported by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) “…the interaction of aid and institutional quality has a robust 
positive relationship with growth that is strongest in instrumental variable regressions 
(BurnsideCraig & DollarDavid, 2004).  
The World Bank has significantly stretched its policy boundaries by authorizing 
‘good governance’ as a fundamental component of its development strategy. Since 1996 the 
World Bank has begun over 600 governance related programs and initiatives in 95 countries 
and is involved in supporting significant programs of governance and public sector reform in 
50 countries. Meanwhile, governance reforms, including the building of stronger public 
institutions, move center stage in aid effectiveness debates (OECD).In 2003, United States 
launched its very own aid development assistance program, whose aid mechanism is largely 
based on a competitive assessment of developing countries governance performance. Under 
this program good governance is a precondition for granting aid to developing countries and 
they rely on publicly available governance indicators (KnollMartin & ZloczystiPetra, 2011). 
Yet there are wide spread debate among the academics “…whether perception-based 
governance indicators are a satisfactorily measure and distinguish between various 
dimensions of governance, and an appropriate measure for allocating aid (ArndtChristiane & 
OmanCharles, 2006). A very few studies have been conducted on validity and reliability of 
these indicators, and “…to date, the indicators stand as an elaborate untested hypothesis 
about the nature of governance…reliance upon them for any purpose is premature” (M.A. 
Thomas, 2006). However, some researchers and practitioners found little robust evidence of 
3 
 
positive and negative association between good governance and aid effectiveness. 
Scholars maintained that the traditional cross-country empirical work has failed to 
provide statistically significant insights on relationship between governance and aid. Michal 
Opoulos and Sukhatme (1989) conclude that the cross-country evidence is ambiguous, and 
White (1992a) indicated that negligible aid’s on macroeconomic impact. He goes on to argue 
that the absence of a relationship between aid and growth is a fairly well established result. 
The seeming lack of a positive macroeconomic impact of aid in combination with the many 
favorable micro-based project evaluations is a puzzle 
Based on few empirical literature conducted on the impact of governance on the 
effectiveness of aid (BrautigamDeborah, 2000); (HeckelmanJac & KnackStephen, 2005)  
reveals aid and aid reliance to be negatively associated with various dimensions of 
governance when cross-country analysis is undertaken on bureaucratic quality, corruption, 
and the rule of law. Likewise a study by Ragan and Subramanian (2007), exhibit in countries 
that receive more ODA, there is a negative impact on governance reliant industries, 
(RaganRaghuam G & SubramanianArvind, 2007)while at the same time the primary 
instrument of donors aid is empirically linked with worsening quality of governance. 
However, in a cross-section of more than 150 countries, observed that there is empirical 
evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development 
outcomes (KaufmannDaniel, KraayAart, Zoido-LobatonPablo, 1999).  
One of the most important attribute of development outcomes is adherence to the rule 
of law and regulation. Rule of law and regulation are also indicators that show the countries 
reliability. Weak rule of law and lack of good governance is a major threat to development 
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(UNDP).Moreover, governance reliance industries mainly dominated in manufacturing and 
services sectors, as these sectors require extensive complex transaction among the parties that 
rely on rule of law and regulation. The studies of Kaufmann et al.’s showing six dimensions 
of governance Rule of Law is worsened by aid while the effects on the other five variables 
namely Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, and Control of Corruption are very weak. 
The countries in transition have taken a giant stride towards development and had 
achieved remarkable progress in implementing reform policies over years. We expect better 
governance would contribute improvements in recipient countries and therefore, it would lead 
to effective utilization of ODA and bad governance would potentially exacerbate countries 
situation and therefore would lead to ineffective utilization of ODA.   Using the data of 32 
transition countries over the period of 1996-2014, we will test empirically in this study 
whether there has been any significant impact of Governance on the effective utilization 
ODA in the countries in transition  
1 
 
Chapter 3 
Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Theoretical Model 
Shortage of resources is a severe issue for developing countries. The persistent gap 
between savings and investments compel the countries to fulfill the bridge through foreign 
aid.  Harrod-Domar model stated that saving has direct impact on economic growth. Higher-
savings create opportunities of investments; ultimately accumulate the capital resulting in 
high economic growth. Keeping in view the impact of savings on economic growth, 
developing countries seek foreign aid to overcome the resource problem and fulfill the gap 
between savings and investments. Therefore, it is expected that foreign aid has significant 
positive impact on economic growth and written as follows; 
Yt  = F ( Ait) -----------------------------(1) 
Where Yt is GDP and Ait is aid received by ith country in time t as a fraction of GDP; 
Moyo (2009) states that aid does not provide significant results because of political 
instability and bad governance. In the developing countries, generally there is virtual 
absence of any mechanism to monitor the aid utilization. Most of the time governments 
utilize such funds for their political mileage. Therefore, there are several political and 
institutional factors which slow down the process of development.   Thus, the growth 
equation can be simplified as under; 
Yt = f ( Ait, Git) -------------------------------(2) 
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Where Git is the number of Political and governance indicators in period t. 
Ait> 0 and Git> 0   
Besides that, there are some controlling variables which are imperative to be 
included in the growth equation to avoid specification biasness problem. Finally, the 
equation 2 can be written as; 
Yt = F ( Ait, Git,Xit) --------------------------(3) 
Where Xit is number of controlling variables in period t 
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Data and measurement of variables 
The proposed study is going to examine the relation among growth, governance and 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in transition and developing countries to see to what 
extent past policies had been effective in generating economic activities and to what extent 
governance affects ODA.  
We will investigate empirically the effects of good governance and aid effectiveness 
on economic growth, first by employing the Burnside and Dollar (2000), BD specification 
using data for all 32 transitions and developing economies. Our analysis spans the transition 
years from 1996 to 2013. As already stated, reason for focusing on transition and developing 
economies is to separate out the impact of explanatory variables in transition and developing 
countries and reduce some of the heterogeneity that is inherent in cross-country analysis. 
Nevertheless, while transitional economies are a fairly homogenous group, there is still some 
heterogeneity between transitional economies, e.g., some are now European Union members 
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while others are still ruled by authoritarian communist parties. Transition economies also 
differ with respect to their natural endowments and years of central planning. 
The data for the study will be drawn from World Bank. Out of six governance 
indicators mentioned above, the proposed study focuses on three indicators i.e. control of 
corruption, government effectiveness and political stability will be used. The study will use 
panel data for both transition and developing countries. The developing countries will be 
selected according to the UN criteria. In addition, data will be collected from IMF, Penn 
World, Macro Data, OECD and cross-country surveys carried out by international and non-
governmental organizations and various other authentic journals written on the subject. 
3.2.2. Measurement of variables 
 The World Bank’s World Wide Governance Indicators provide data on six 
governance indicators including: voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.  
 GDP  per capita as a dependent variable 
 There is a debate which aid indicator may be used for study such as quadratic form, 
log form etc. In the proposed study, we used aid as a fraction of GNI. 
 Openness variable will be obtained from Pen world table. 
 Inflation and Monetary aggregate variables would be used as proxy of monetary side. 
 Net oil rent % of GDP  
 Gross fixed capital formation and FDI are selected to seek real sector impact. 
 Population is used as a proxy of demand side/market. 
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3.2.3. Econometrics Model 
Economic prosperity is generally measured by growth in GDP.  In our proposed study 
we used real GDP per capita dependent variables while governance and aid are proposed 
explanatory variables. Besides, there are number of variables which have significant effect on 
economic growth, therefore, these variables were also included in the model. Further, 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) included interaction variable of aid and governance to investigate 
the conditional effect on economic growth. The proposed dissertation estimated the 
dependent variable being real GDP per capita (GDP) with aid and three governance indicators, 
namely political stability, government effectiveness and control of corruption with controlling 
variables for transition and developing countries.  
The simplified equation can be written as; 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡(4) 
Where Yt is the growth rate of per capita GDP; Ait is a Aid of ith country in period t, 
Git is governance variables; Xit are controlling variables representing M2, net oil rent, gross 
fixed capital formation, openness etc. Ait*Git is interaction variable of aid and governance 
while µ𝑡  is usual Error term.  
Since there is a structural difference between transition and developing countries, 
therefore, a dummy was included in the model for comparison and separate out the effect of 
transition and developing countries. Thus, the equation 4 can be simplified as under; 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐷 + 𝜇t--------------- (5) 
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The existing literature revealed that there is a simultaneity problem among dependent 
and explanatory variables. Therefore, some econometric tests were used to check the 
simultaneity problem prior to estimating the ordinary least square method for panel data of 
transition and developing countries. 
Where Y is GDP per capita at time ‘t’, 𝛽0  is intercept , 𝛽1, 𝛽2 , 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽5 are 
coefficients to be estimated, Ins is instrumental variable, Yt-1 is lag of GDP per capita and 
𝜇𝑡is error term assumed to be white noise.  
The equation 6 was estimated using multivariate regression techniques for 32 
transition countries and 45 developing nations using panel data for the period of 1996-2013. 
For the three different governance indicators, political stability, government effectiveness and 
control of corruption, we estimated three separate equations with three different interaction 
variables to capture the impact of aid on economic growth conditionally governance and 
some controlling variables in the model. Finally, robustness test was applied to examine the 
significance and robustness of the variables. 
3.3. Empirical Evidences: 
 The study consists of 32 transition and 45 developing countries covering the period of 
1996-2013 using panel data. Purpose of this study is to seek the causal relationship of aid, 
governance and growth. Three different governance indicators we reselected to perform the 
econometrics analysis. Each governance indicator estimated three different equations, first 
equation consists of only explanatory variables while second equation was to analyze 
interaction effect on GDP per capita and third equation is to separate out effect of transition 
and developing countries by using dummy variable. The present study is unique in a sense 
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that it used governance and political indicators to measure the government efficiency rather 
than policy variables.  
Table 1: Impact of ODA and Political Stability on Economic Growth for Developing and 
Transition Countries  
Variables GDPPC GDPPC GDPPC 
Political Stability  1.777 
(3.27)** 
1.677 
(2.49)** 
1.70 
(2.52)** 
Openness 0.766 
(9.45)** 
0.767 
(9.77)** 
0.758 
(9.89)** 
POPt -0.078 
(3.44)** 
-0.078 
(3.48)** 
-0.078 
(3.52)** 
M2 -0.894 
(2.47)** 
-0.896 
(2.47)** 
-0.933 
(2.68)** 
FDI 1.032 
(1.42) 
1.034 
(1.43) 
1.014 
(1.35) 
ORGDP 0.931 
(2.22)* 
0.917 
(2.24)* 
0.931 
(2.19)* 
ARMIMPOTS 0.237 
(2.16)* 
0.239 
(2.19)* 
0.225 
(2.07)* 
GEFGDP -0.892 
(1.13) 
-0.907 
(1.13) 
-0.955 
(1.21) 
Inflation -0.824 
(2.05)* 
-0.824 
(2.04)* 
-0.820 
(2.01)* 
Net ODAGNI 0.970 
(4.66)** 
0.607 
(0.53) 
0.626 
(0.55) 
Y  0.011 
{0.28) 
0.009 
(0.24) 
D1   -13.434 
(1.07) 
Constant 555.647 
(13.45)** 
589.395 
(11.26) 
603.619 
(10.74)** 
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01 
 
The multivariate least square method using panel data was used to investigate 
relationship of  ODA and governance on economic growth. Three different governance 
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indicators were used to examine the impact. Table 1 presented results of multivariate 
regression of three different   models which were run. First equation consists of empirical 
evidence of ODA and governance on GDP per capita including some control variables. The 
results suggested that political stability has significant effect on economic activities. It is 
estimated that 1% improvement in political condition will increase per capita income on an 
average of 1.77% at 1% level. The results confirm that political instability deteriorated the 
growth process. Previous studies apparent     that political instability shrinks economic 
activities resulting capital flight. Political Stability means predictable environment which 
may attract both domestic and international investors creating jobs and accelerate the 
economic growth.  However, ODA has no relation with GDP per capita and confirmed the 
earlier findings of Easterly.  Surprisingly, neither FDI nor Gross fixed capital formation has 
any significant impact on GDP per capita. It could be possible due to two reasons; first, most 
of the FDI came to services sector which is not as productive as manufacturing sector in 
under-developed countries. Second, there is no technological transfer observed if developed 
nations invest in the less developed regions. These multinational companies invest in these 
nations because of cheap labour. . Recent studies stated that total factor productivity  is the 
only determinant of long run economic growth and R&D expenditure and Human Capital are 
key factors of TFP. It is clear that FDI received from foreign countries failed to increase 
contribution of TFP in developing countries.  
  Another interesting finding is negative significant effect of M2 on GDP per capita. 
This finding confirmed that the capital market both in transition and developing countries are 
not liberalized and the State influences on monetary policy witnessed inflationary effect in 
the economy. Population relationship with growth is debatable in the literature, some 
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economists’ state that population is an opportunity for developing nations due to huge market 
and had significant effect on growth. On the other hand, some economists believe that 
population a severe problem for these nations because rising population exerts pressure on 
job creation while these counters are unable to absorb these laborers in the job market 
causing high unemployment and socioeconomic issues. The results confirmed the later 
argument.  
  Burnside and Dollar (2000) found conditional effect of aid on economic growth. They 
used interaction variable of aid and government policies and concluded that aid had 
significant positive relation if government used good policies. Therefore, equation 2 was 
estimated by incorporating interaction variable (y) in the model. Our empirical evidences 
suggested that there is    no interaction effect observed despite significant positive 
relationship found among GDP, political stability and openness while aid, FDI and Gross 
fixed capital formation have no effect   on GDP per capita.  
  Finally, we estimate equation 3 to compare the separate effect of transition countries 
and developing countries. The results indicated that the dummy variable is statistically 
insignificant.   This result revealed that both transition countries and developing countries are 
not market economy. The economic system in both regions seemed to be same; controlled by 
central government.  
  There are some other governance indicators such as control of corruption and 
government effectiveness. The table 2 provides the empirical evidences of multivariate 
regression using panel data for transition and developing countries.  
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Table 2: Impact of ODA and Governance Effectiveness on Economic Growth for Developing 
and Transition Countries 
Variables GDPPC GDPPC GDPPC 
Governance Effectiveness 
Percentile 
1.357 
(1.40) 
3.323 
(2.79)** 
2.349 
(2.78)** 
Openness 0.670 
(6.51)** 
0.712 
(6.14)** 
0.703 
(6.21)** 
POPt -0.085 
(3.00)** 
-0.079 
(2.94)** 
-0.079 
(2.79)** 
M2 -1.046 
(3.18)** 
-1.014 
(3.18)** 
-1.057 
(3.43)** 
FDI 1.294 
(1.74) 
1.185 
(1.51) 
1.158 
(1.43) 
ORGDP 0.759 
(1.84) 
0.625 
(1.55)* 
0.639 
(1.51)* 
ARMIMPOTS 0.193 
(1.63) 
0.175 
(1.50) 
0.160 
(1.38) 
GEFGDP -0.751 
(0.93) 
-0.714 
(0.85) 
-0.769 
(0.93) 
Inflation -0.862 
(2.06)* 
-0.880 
(2.19)* 
-0.877 
(2.15)* 
Net ODAGNI 0.981 
(4.56)** 
4.486 
(5.34)** 
4.476 
(5.36)** 
Y  -0.101 
{3.93)** 
-0.102 
(4.02)** 
D1   -14.814 
(1.03) 
Constant 619.076 
(10.78)** 
573.039 
(10.84)** 
588.660 
(9.83)** 
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01 
 
Colum 1 presented results of multivariate regression model excluding interaction and 
dummy variables. It indicates that all variables have significant impact on GDP per capita 
except aid, FDI and gross fixed capital formation.  While equation 2 investigated the 
interaction effect and confirmed Burnside and Dallor (2002) findings that aid has conditional 
significant effect on GDP. It is witnessed in equation 2 that political stability is a sufficient 
condition for stimulate economic growth. The likely policy implication is that aid would have 
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significant effect on economic growth subject to good governance. Therefore, the study 
concludes that without good governance, aid has no effect in eliminating poverty and 
accelerating economic activities despite, political stability was observed.  Finally, the study 
seeks to compare the impact of aid on economic growth with good governance by 
incorporating a dummy variable in both transition and developing countries and that there is 
no significant difference in transition and developing nations. The possible reason for 
homogenous effect of both transition and developing countries would be that developing 
countries are not market economy and structure of developing countries’ economy is close to 
the transition economy and highly influenced by the government.   
Control of corruption is another important governance indicator. Corruption hinders 
growth process and generates socioeconomic imbalances in the economy. Thus, it is 
imperative to investigate interaction and individual effect of corruption and aid on economic 
growth. The table 3 summarized the results incorporating corruption in the mode.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Impact of ODA and Control of Corruption on Economic Growth for Developing and 
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Transition Countries 
Variables GDPPC GDPPC GDPPC 
Control of Corruption 
Percentile 
1.414 
(2.28)* 
0.319 
(0.51) 
0.351 
(0.54)** 
Openness 0.661 
(6.44)** 
0.733 
(9.35)** 
0.723 
(8.05)** 
POPt -0.081 
(3.02)** 
-0.079 
(3.07)** 
-0.079 
(3.10)** 
M2 -1.053 
(3.04)** 
-0.936 
(2.65)** 
-0.981 
(2.88)** 
FDI 1.296 
(1.84) 
0.803 
(1.19) 
0.763 
(1.08) 
ORGDP 0.816 
(2.06)* 
0.811 
(1.91) 
0.824 
(1.85)* 
ARMIMPOTS 0.199 
(1.76) 
0.228 
(2.03)* 
0.212 
(1.89) 
GEFGDP -0.680 
(0.85) 
-1.068 
(1.34) 
-1.134 
(1.43) 
Inflation -0.851 
(2.07)* 
-0.843 
(2.09)* 
-0.842 
(2.07)* 
Net ODAGNI 0.886 
(4.51)** 
1.030 
(5.38)** 
0.987 
(5.21)** 
Y  -0.0.37 
{4.19)** 
-0.036 
(4.07)** 
D1   -17.326 
(1.28) 
Constant 628.241 
(12.78)** 
603.596 
(13.09)** 
621.869 
(11.92)** 
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01 
 
  The first equation summarized results of the explanatory variable and concluded the 
same results showing that the proposed data has no  severe problem like multicolinearity, 
simultaneity etc. The minimization in corruption has significant positive relation with GDP 
per capita implies that corruption is a key determinant of economic growth. Equation 2 
estimated using interaction variable of aid and control of corruption and observed significant 
interaction effect. Further, it is revealed that Aid has significant positive effect on GDP per 
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capita indicating that control of corruption is imperative for effective utilization of aid. 
Unless corruption is controlled, aid has no effect on GDP per capita. Thus, our findings 
confirmed that corruption is the main constraint for aid utilization. Finally, equation 3 
indulged that both transition and developing countries have similarities in economic systems. 
It implies that whether countries are developing or transition economy, the economy system 
in both economies highly influential by government rather than market economy. 
  The proposed study investigated aid and governance impact on economic growth as 
well as seeks interaction effect on economic growth. Three governance indicators are used to 
examine the relationship. The study concluded that political stability is a sufficient condition 
to accelerate the growth process but the key variable is good governance. Therefore, key 
finding of the study is that Institutions efficiency is critical for effective utilization of aid 
regardless, the structure of the economy. Unless governance is efficient, aid utilization is 
ineffective. Further, good governance also minimize corruption as our finding suggested that 
control of corruption has significant effect on economic growth. Thus, it is concluded that 
good governance is imperative to minimize corruption to foster economic growth. 
  The robustness test performed revealed that except political stability other two 
governance indicators and ODA found robustness. Thus, the study concluded that both 
control of corruption and government effectiveness are key indicators for effective aid 
utilization and political stability is a sufficient condition for generating economic activities. 
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
  The last five decades witnessed huge ODA inflows to developing countries both from 
multilateral and bilateral sources but there is no significant improvement in the living 
standards in these countries. Despite efforts made by developed countries, the under-
developed countries failed to pick up momentum required for a persistent high growth mainly 
due to lack of effective governance and unstable political scenarios. Therefore, World Bank 
and other financial institutions emphasized developing countries to improve government 
efficiency and ensure effective implementation and utilization of ODA. 
 Keeping in view importance of ODA for developing countries, propose of the study 
was to investigate impact of ODA and governance on GDP per capita. Previous studies used 
government policies as a proxy to measure governance efficiency and found conditional 
significance of ODA on GDP per capita growth. However, some studies did not find any 
conditional significance relationship. The present study used different governance indicators 
estimated by World Bank such as political stability, government effectiveness and control of 
corruption for both transition and developing countries.  
 The panel data of 32 transition and 45 developing counties was collected for the 
period of 1996-2013 to estimate multivariate regression models for three different governance 
indicators with ODA. Our findings drew key policy recommendations for developing 
countries. We did not find any significant relationship between aid and GDP per capita while 
using political stability and government effectiveness as governance indicators but aid 
revealed significant positive relationship with GDP per capita when control of corruption was 
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used as a proxy of government effectiveness. It indicated that unless corruption is controlled 
ODA cannot provide fruitful and tangible results. Further, all governance indicators used in 
this study have significance positive effect on GDP per capita. Then, we included interaction 
variable of ODA and governance, the results confirmed conditional effect of ODA on GDP 
per capita with government effectiveness and control of corruption while it is insignificant 
with political stability. 
 We also investigated comparison of transition and developing countries by including 
dummy variable in the model. Our findings concluded that there is no significant difference 
between transition and developing nations. It has an important implication that institutions 
played vital role whether it is developing countries which the present study assumed closed to 
market economy and transition countries despite many transition countries are also 
developing countries. Therefore, all these nations need huge reforms to improve institutions 
efficiency which played key role in economic development. Further,  fixed capital formation 
has no significant relation with GDP per capita. It suggested that huge government 
intervention prevents private sector to invest in real sector due to inconsistency in 
government policies. Finally, robustness of the model was estimated and found significant 
except for political stability. It shows that our methodology is quite good and results are not 
biased and could be used for policy formulation in future. 
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Annex 1 
 
Annex-2 
                                                                                                  
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    344.36269
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     585.6465   43.55544    13.45   0.000     500.2794    671.0136
                       netodagni     .9695681   .2081113     4.66   0.000     .5616774    1.377459
                       inflation    -.8235172   .4020675    -2.05   0.041    -1.611555   -.0354795
                          gcfgdp    -.8922268   .7913328    -1.13   0.260    -2.443211    .6587569
                       armimpots     .2367507   .1098262     2.16   0.031     .0214953     .452006
                           orgdp     .9134184   .4109104     2.22   0.026     .1080489    1.718788
                             fdi     1.032394   .7269566     1.42   0.156    -.3924151    2.457202
                              m2    -.8939824   .3613687    -2.47   0.013    -1.602252   -.1857127
                            popt    -.0779179    .022641    -3.44   0.001    -.1222935   -.0335424
                         openess     .7655868   .0810452     9.45   0.000     .6067412    .9244324
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi     1.776833   .5440015     3.27   0.001     .7106097    2.843056
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   1391.36
       overall = 0.0565                                        max =        78
       between = 0.4451                                        avg =      66.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0566                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg gdppc politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni, robust
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Annex-3 
                                                                                                  
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    344.52419
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     589.3955   52.35316    11.26   0.000     486.7852    692.0058
                               y     .0109978   .0389596     0.28   0.778    -.0653617    .0873573
                       netodagni     .6074667    1.15627     0.53   0.599    -1.658782    2.873715
                       inflation    -.8239874   .4037867    -2.04   0.041    -1.615395     -.03258
                          gcfgdp    -.9065888   .8012364    -1.13   0.258    -2.476983    .6638058
                       armimpots     .2386208   .1088265     2.19   0.028     .0253249    .4519168
                           orgdp     .9173471   .4104224     2.24   0.025     .1129341     1.72176
                             fdi     1.034294   .7247807     1.43   0.154    -.3862499    2.454838
                              m2    -.8963778   .3628192    -2.47   0.013     -1.60749   -.1852652
                            popt    -.0777449   .0223191    -3.48   0.000    -.1214894   -.0340003
                         openess     .7674672   .0785502     9.77   0.000     .6135116    .9214227
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi     1.676919   .6744086     2.49   0.013     .3551022    2.998736
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   1768.78
       overall = 0.0566                                        max =        78
       between = 0.4104                                        avg =      66.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0568                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg gdppc politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni y , robust
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Annex-4 
 
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    344.59627
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     603.6191   56.18793    10.74   0.000     493.4928    713.7454
                              D1    -13.43404   12.54466    -1.07   0.284    -38.02112    11.15304
                               y     .0093004    .038265     0.24   0.808    -.0656977    .0842985
                       netodagni     .6258698   1.145279     0.55   0.585    -1.618836    2.870575
                       inflation    -.8196831   .4070099    -2.01   0.044    -1.617408   -.0219584
                          gcfgdp    -.9549359   .7914721    -1.21   0.228    -2.506193    .5963208
                       armimpots     .2254771   .1090209     2.07   0.039     .0118001    .4391541
                           orgdp     .9309053   .4260199     2.19   0.029     .0959217    1.765889
                             fdi     1.013892   .7525011     1.35   0.178    -.4609835    2.488767
                              m2    -.9333776   .3485988    -2.68   0.007    -1.616619   -.2501365
                            popt    -.0783165   .0222405    -3.52   0.000     -.121907    -.034726
                         openess     .7583629   .0766542     9.89   0.000     .6081235    .9086024
politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi     1.700002   .6749631     2.52   0.012     .3770983    3.022905
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =  22878.50
       overall = 0.0570                                        max =        78
       between = 0.3930                                        avg =      66.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.0570                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       933
. xtreg gdppc politicalstabilityandabsenceofvi openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni y D1 , robust
                                                                                                  
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    345.30485
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     619.0759   57.42585    10.78   0.000     506.5234    731.6285
                       netodagni     .9814347   .2154232     4.56   0.000     .5592129    1.403656
                       inflation    -.8618072   .4191924    -2.06   0.040    -1.683409   -.0402052
                          gcfgdp    -.7513045   .8050683    -0.93   0.351    -2.329209    .8266004
                       armimpots     .1926212   .1180845     1.63   0.103    -.0388202    .4240625
                           orgdp     .7586119   .4115008     1.84   0.065    -.0479148    1.565139
                             fdi     1.293848   .7429483     1.74   0.082    -.1623042    2.749999
                              m2    -1.046282   .3295263    -3.18   0.001    -1.692141   -.4004219
                            popt    -.0851858   .0283835    -3.00   0.003    -.1408163   -.0295552
                         openess     .6699647   .1029121     6.51   0.000     .4682607    .8716688
governmenteffectivenesspercentil     1.357408   .9714314     1.40   0.162    -.5465625    3.261379
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   2700.88
       overall = 0.0517                                        max =        78
       between = 0.5123                                        avg =      66.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0515                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg gdppc governmenteffectivenesspercentil openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni, robust
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Annex -5 
 
Annex -6 
                                                                                                  
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    344.20764
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     573.0394   52.85903    10.84   0.000     469.4376    676.6412
                              y1    -.1011551   .0257711    -3.93   0.000    -.1516656   -.0506447
                       netodagni     4.486149   .8399444     5.34   0.000     2.839888     6.13241
                       inflation    -.8802627   .4020961    -2.19   0.029    -1.668356   -.0921689
                          gcfgdp    -.7137706   .8432309    -0.85   0.397    -2.366473    .9389316
                       armimpots     .1749891   .1166517     1.50   0.134     -.053644    .4036221
                           orgdp     .6250788   .4022936     1.55   0.120    -.1634021     1.41356
                             fdi     1.185263   .7837738     1.51   0.130    -.3509052    2.721432
                              m2    -1.013862   .3186876    -3.18   0.001    -1.638478   -.3892453
                            popt    -.0788335   .0268288    -2.94   0.003    -.1314169   -.0262501
                         openess      .711943   .1159198     6.14   0.000     .4847444    .9391417
governmenteffectivenesspercentil     2.322632   .8318775     2.79   0.005     .6921816    3.953081
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   4363.62
       overall = 0.0590                                        max =        78
       between = 0.5795                                        avg =      66.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0586                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg gdppc governmenteffectivenesspercentil openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni y1 , robust
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Annex – 7 
 
                                                                                                  
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    344.26502
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons       588.66   59.87656     9.83   0.000     471.3041    706.0159
                              D1    -14.81397   14.35312    -1.03   0.302    -42.94556    13.31762
                              y1    -.1019266   .0253575    -4.02   0.000    -.1516263   -.0522269
                       netodagni     4.475893   .8346981     5.36   0.000     2.839915    6.111871
                       inflation    -.8766968   .4069103    -2.15   0.031    -1.674226   -.0791674
                          gcfgdp    -.7694017   .8292655    -0.93   0.354    -2.394732    .8559288
                       armimpots     .1604094   .1165592     1.38   0.169    -.0680423    .3888612
                           orgdp     .6390114   .4241336     1.51   0.132    -.1922751    1.470298
                             fdi     1.157987    .810388     1.43   0.153    -.4303442    2.746319
                              m2    -1.056614   .3083119    -3.43   0.001    -1.660895   -.4523343
                            popt     -.079265   .0268369    -2.95   0.003    -.1318645   -.0266656
                         openess     .7031065   .1133027     6.21   0.000     .4810373    .9251756
governmenteffectivenesspercentil     2.349473   .8454433     2.78   0.005     .6924342    4.006511
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =   4324.38
       overall = 0.0596                                        max =        78
       between = 0.5811                                        avg =      66.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.0589                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       933
. xtreg gdppc governmenteffectivenesspercentil openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni y1 D1 , robust
                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    345.24015
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons      618.241   48.37829    12.78   0.000     523.4213    713.0607
                       netodagni     .8858567   .1965189     4.51   0.000     .5006867    1.271027
                       inflation    -.8506595   .4111478    -2.07   0.039    -1.656494   -.0448247
                          gcfgdp    -.6796829   .8010113    -0.85   0.396    -2.249636    .8902704
                       armimpots     .1985294   .1128402     1.76   0.079    -.0226333     .419692
                           orgdp     .8159352    .395387     2.06   0.039     .0409908     1.59088
                             fdi     1.296472   .7048237     1.84   0.066    -.0849568    2.677901
                              m2    -1.053381    .346855    -3.04   0.002    -1.733204   -.3735577
                            popt    -.0807974   .0267647    -3.02   0.003    -.1332552   -.0283396
                         openess     .6607296   .1026562     6.44   0.000     .4595272     .861932
controlofcorruptionpercentileran     1.414378   .6200535     2.28   0.023      .199095     2.62966
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =   2668.30
       overall = 0.0522                                        max =        78
       between = 0.5266                                        avg =      66.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0519                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg gdppc controlofcorruptionpercentileran openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni, robust
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                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    343.47334
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons     603.5963   46.10557    13.09   0.000      513.231    693.9615
                              y3     .0365773   .0087257     4.19   0.000     .0194753    .0536793
                       netodagni     1.029667   .1813061     5.68   0.000     .6743133     1.38502
                       inflation    -.8434959   .4026971    -2.09   0.036    -1.632768   -.0542242
                          gcfgdp    -1.068117   .7974231    -1.34   0.180    -2.631038    .4948036
                       armimpots     .2275552   .1120374     2.03   0.042     .0079659    .4471444
                           orgdp     .8108773   .4246499     1.91   0.056    -.0214212    1.643176
                             fdi     .8032724   .6771187     1.19   0.236    -.5238559    2.130401
                              m2    -.9356419   .3528753    -2.65   0.008    -1.627265   -.2440189
                            popt    -.0788182    .025486    -3.09   0.002    -.1287698   -.0288665
                         openess     .7326757   .0921539     7.95   0.000     .5520574    .9132941
controlofcorruptionpercentileran     .3185472   .6275681     0.51   0.612    -.9114636    1.548558
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =   2378.23
       overall = 0.0619                                        max =        78
       between = 0.4962                                        avg =      66.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0625                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       934
. xtreg gdppc controlofcorruptionpercentileran openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni y3 , robust
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                             rho            0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
                         sigma_e    343.57725
                         sigma_u            0
                                                                                                  
                           _cons      621.869   52.18782    11.92   0.000     519.5827    724.1552
                              D1    -17.32612   13.54213    -1.28   0.201    -43.86821    9.215964
                              y3     .0364492   .0089551     4.07   0.000     .0188976    .0540008
                       netodagni     .9868786   .1893093     5.21   0.000     .6158392    1.357918
                       inflation    -.8418694   .4060822    -2.07   0.038    -1.637776   -.0459629
                          gcfgdp    -1.134064   .7942233    -1.43   0.153    -2.690713    .4225854
                       armimpots     .2123512   .1121434     1.89   0.058    -.0074458    .4321482
                           orgdp     .8236941   .4440906     1.85   0.064    -.0467076    1.694096
                             fdi     .7631033   .7075202     1.08   0.281    -.6236108    2.149817
                              m2    -.9806253    .341076    -2.88   0.004    -1.649122   -.3121286
                            popt    -.0791348   .0255519    -3.10   0.002    -.1292156    -.029054
                         openess     .7234957   .0898475     8.05   0.000     .5473979    .8995936
controlofcorruptionpercentileran     .3508926   .6460844     0.54   0.587    -.9154096    1.617195
                                                                                                  
                           gdppc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                 Robust
                                                                                                  
                                                      (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in year)
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)      =  57921.05
       overall = 0.0624                                        max =        78
       between = 0.4864                                        avg =      66.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.0626                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: year                            Number of groups   =        14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       933
. xtreg gdppc controlofcorruptionpercentileran openess popt m2 fdi orgdp armimpots gcfgdp inflation netodagni y3 D1 , robust
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Annex -10 
List of Developing Countries 
Algeria 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. Kenya Pakistan Tanzania 
Argentina Ethiopia Malaysia Peru Thailand 
Botswana Guatemala Mali Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago 
Bolivia Ghana Morocco Philippines Uruguay 
Brazil Gambia, The Malawi Senegal Venezuela, RB 
Chile Guyana Madagascar 
Sierra 
Leone Zambia 
Colombia India Mexico Sri Lanka Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica Indonesia Nicaragua Turkey 
 Cote d'Ivoire Honduras Niger Tunisia 
 Ecuador Haiti Nigeria Togo 
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Annex-11 
List of Transition Countries 
Albania Estonia Mongolia Uzbekistan 
Azerbaijan Georgia Poland Vietnam 
Armenia Hungary Romania   
Belarus Kazakhstan 
Russian 
Federation   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Kyrgyz 
Republic Serbia   
Bulgaria Lao PDR Slovak Republic   
Cambodia Latvia Slovenia   
China Lithuania Tajikistan   
Croatia Moldova Turkmenistan   
Czech Republic 
Macedonia, 
FYR Ukraine   
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
